SIGNED COLUMN. A signed column by Camilo A. Osorio Maya, columnist at IN-KluSo. A Pattern Map of a cultural signal observed on the ground — the human counterpoint to Magma’s anonymous signals. GROUND division · 2026-11-10.

Rubén and Théo are invented characters; the facts they state are in the notes at the end, and what is rumor is marked (◆).

What I saw

I have crossed Barrio Antioquia several times. The last was at midday this November, in an Uber that left the Guayabal avenue to dodge the trancón [traffic jam] and cut straight through the middle of the neighborhood. That time I went looking.

The streets were full: cars, motorbikes, family shops with the door open, women on the sidewalk, children, old men sitting outside. A midday neighborhood like any other, until you look at the corners.

On the corners there were young men. Some on bicycles, not exercising: still, in the middle of the intersection, holding up the traffic and looking toward the next corner, like someone waiting for a signal to let you through. Others were tucking something between the bricks or into the cracks in the walls. And whistles were blowing. Not whistling: referee whistles, plastic ones, in the mouths of pelaos [kids] who didn’t look older than eighteen. One blew, and another, farther on, answered.

One of the bike kids raised his hand and the line of cars stopped. The driver looked at me in the rearview mirror and said, slyly: «Hay un trancón, toca esperar» [“There’s a jam, we’ll have to wait”]. We both knew the jam was a pelao with a bicycle and a whistle. Then, without my asking, he added: «Están un poco alterados por los operativos del presidente» [“They’re a bit on edge because of the president’s operations”]. He didn’t say which ones, and I didn’t ask. Nobody in the car argued the point: in the neighborhood, an operation belongs to whoever shows up.

We left by the street that skirts the neighborhood. There the landscape changes trades: a row of informal truck and bus washes, hoses on the ground, soapy water running toward the drain. It is the city of freight, the one that washes itself at the end of the shift.

And at the exit, as at the entrance, I saw soldiers. Keeping watch. I don’t know which is worse: that they are there, or that they are there and inside everything keeps working.

That is why I wanted to understand how it came to this. At times I tell it the way a taxi driver who never existed, Rubén, would have told it to a tourist asking what everyone asks. The dialogues are invented; the facts he states are in the notes at the end, and what is rumor is marked.


What Rubén would have told him

—And why this neighborhood? —Théo would ask, just arrived from Marseille.

—Because of the airport and because of a decree —Rubén would say, pointing at the dark runway of the Olaya Herrera—. Look at the light: this part is darker than the rest of the city. A mayor said it in a press release: the aviation authority requires the street lighting to be kept low, «pero eso lo aprovechan las plazas de vicio» [“but the drug-selling spots take advantage of it”]. And in 1951 another mayor signed Decree 517, which sent the women who worked in prostitution to live here. A tolerance zone. It didn’t last long on paper; the reputation stayed. It wasn’t fate, mijo: it was decisions. Then came marijuana, and in the seventies cocaine, with the airport next door back when it was still the international one. There were boys who went off as mules to Miami and New York. And when the steady jobs ran out, a lot of people took whatever there was to keep the family going.

—Is it true they used to get into the airport at night to load small planes?

—◆ So they say, and that they got paid in clothes. I never met the one who did it: it was always somebody’s cousin. What did come back from up there was things: sneakers, jackets, a tape recorder. Sometimes the thing came back and the one who sent it didn’t. Griselda grew up here; here she left some gold-plated cutlery she gave to a neighbor, and in ’98 it was shown in a museum the neighborhood set up inside a bus, next to the balaclava a family buried their boy in. In the nineties there was war: more than two hundred dead in ’93 alone.

—And why, if everybody knows, does nothing happen?

—Last year they took more than six hundred in the sector, and the corner is still there. A few years ago twenty-two police officers were charged, most of them from the Belén station, for taking money to let business go on. The corner falls. The big money stays up top, in El Poblado and in another country. The corner gets chased. The money gets invited to dinner.


What Rubén doesn’t see

Rubén is partly right, and I can’t give him the rest. Nobody publishes how many of those arrested are bosses and how many are pelaos with a whistle, so “the corner falls” is a thesis, not a fact. And there is something his line hides: that corner keeps households going. Many people in the neighborhood got into this when the steady jobs ran out —an academic study of the neighborhood documented it in 2011—, and what comes in doesn’t all leave; some of it stays, like the cutlery. It is also true that in the nineties two hundred young men died in a single year and that this November I saw old men sitting on the sidewalk. But that may be the peace of whoever already won: when only one is in charge, fewer people get killed. Fewer dead is not the same as less power.

The map: what the neighborhood resembles

Since that crossing, I haven’t been able to stop seeing the neighborhood as other things that have already happened.

A factory without a factory. In Europe before the great factories, the merchant handed out wool to the cottages of the countryside; each family spun or wove in its own room, and he collected the piece and sold it in the city. Historians call it proto-industry. The work and the risk were scattered across the households; the margin sat with whoever controlled the raw material and the sale. In some regions that system became the factory; in others it died out without ever reaching the second phase. What I saw on the corners has that geometry: the trade is in the street —the one who whistles, the one who stashes, the one who stops the traffic—, and the money is wherever the price is set. The difference is that here nobody makes anything. The corner is the counter. It is a proto-industry that never got its second phase, and doesn’t need it either, because whoever keeps the margin doesn’t live in it.

Marseille has already lived it. In the northern neighborhoods of Marseille, the lookouts —there they call them chouffeurs— are paid by the day to do the same thing I saw done here: watch the next corner. The French drug observatory documented that, in several cities in France, the selling points have menus on Telegram, promotions, loyalty cards, and that the neighborhood’s name printed on the packaging works as a mark of quality. The French police cut the city’s selling points from 161 to 91 between 2020 and 2023, according to a press count I could not check against an official source. And before the French Senate, in 2024, it was said that after the crackdowns the trade reorganized into a single selling point, safer and with more lookouts. Closing corners didn’t close the market: it concentrated it.

The State and the gang seek each other out. A group of economists studied hundreds of combos [neighborhood gangs] in Medellín and found something that runs against intuition: the blocks closest to the police report more gang governance, not less —around a quarter more at four hundred meters—. And near the drug-selling spots, more State presence doesn’t earn the State more legitimacy: it lowers the legitimacy of the State and of the gang at the same time. The neighbors don’t want the drug spot. Nor do they trust whoever goes after it. Barrio Antioquia isn’t in that study, but that could explain, more than any whistle, why the neighborhood doesn’t take a side.

And a reading of my own, which I can’t prove. During the first half of the twentieth century, Antioquia’s textile mills housed their women workers in patronatos [supervised residences] watched over by nuns: leisure was a threat to factory discipline. In 1951, Medellín decided that vice also needed a place, and gave it to a working-class neighborhood next to the runway. I found no historian who links the two. I do: the tolerance zone was the negative of the patronato. The city did not get rid of what it didn’t want to see. It gave it an address.

The figure

Put together, these pieces draw a single figure. A city that decides where the things it doesn’t want to see should go. A market that spreads the work and the risk out on the street and keeps the margin somewhere else. A State that, when it comes closer, doesn’t win the neighbors over but loses them, along with the gang. And a police force that, as in Marseille, can close corners without closing the market, because the margin isn’t on the corner. What I saw from the Uber —boys with whistles in the middle, soldiers at the edges— is that figure seen at street level.

What I don’t agree with

There is an explanation I hear a lot and don’t agree with: that this is «la cultura paisa» [Antioquian culture], the culture of «consiga plata, mijo» [“go get money, son”]. The best study of narco-aesthetics I have read describes an anything-goes culture for getting out of poverty, and on the same page says it isn’t only mobsters or paisas: it is in every social class and every region of the country. And the research on the neighborhood doesn’t talk about culture, it talks about need. Explaining it by culture, or worse, by blood, is a way of not looking at the market. And the margin is the only thing that in seventy-five years hasn’t moved: up top.

A State that only counts what it punishes

Nor is it true that the State only sends soldiers. In September it handed over a school that had been half-built for years —one administration started it and another finished it— and announced a recreo deportivo [sports and recreation center] worth more than thirty-nine billion pesos for the neighborhood. There are youth programs that have come and gone with each government. The problem is not that no money arrives; it is that nobody measures what it does. The arrests get counted and published. Of the pelaos who did not end up on a corner with a whistle, I could not find a single published figure. A State that only counts what it punishes ends up believing that punishing is all it does.

The stands

I think of the soldiers at the entrance and the exit. They were put there so the State would be seen to be present, and it is: at the edges. On the corner in the middle I didn’t see them. There, a boy with a referee’s whistle decides when the traffic moves. In Barrio Antioquia the referee isn’t the State. The State is in the stands.

The bet

My bet, with the map in front of me, is this: as long as the Olaya Herrera stays where it is —its concession runs, according to the documents I found, to some point between 2032 and 2048—, the light will stay low, nobody will build tall, and the corner will go on being the corner. They will keep arresting whoever blows the whistle, and the corner will still be there. The day the airport leaves, that land will be worth money, and then we’ll see who has to leave the neighborhood. If the map holds, it won’t be the margin, which never stayed there: it will be the ones who get up before dawn. And the corner will set up somewhere else, the way it did in Bogotá when they tore down the Cartucho and the trade moved to the Bronx, and from the Bronx to San Bernardo.

Updated 10 Nov 2026: expanded version with “The map”.

Notes and sources

What the column claims, sorted by kind: what the author saw, what the documents say, what is thesis and what is rumor. Open them to check.

Author’s direct observation (Nov 2026)
Documentary sources (in Spanish)
The map: sources for the comparisons
Author’s thesis and inferences
Unsourced rumor (◆)
Characters
barrio-antioquia medellín drug-dealing public-space the-state olaya-herrera